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Abstract
The purpose of this study was to replicate and extend recent findings in the
functional contextual literature by 1) establishing complex deictic relational responding
skills in 3 persons diagnosed with Schizophrenia and mild-moderate Mental Retardation
and 2) assessing generalization through pre and post-instructional measures of Social
Anhedonia and Theory of Mind functioning. Results suggest that increasingly complex
levels of deictic relational responses were acquired and mastered by all 3 participants and
that generalization extended to the Deceptive Container Task (ToM levels 4 & 5) and
Hinting Task. Support is provided for the notion that perspective taking skills might be
shaped through operant conditioning of deictic frames and that acquisition of these skills
may generalize to novel stimuli and settings.

iv

Introduction
According to the National Institute of Mental Health (2009), Schizophrenia is a
brain disorder that occurs in approximately 1% of the general population and is
associated with several genes and environmental influences. A DSM IV-TR diagnosis of
Schizophrenia may occur when 6 criterion are met: A) presentation of two or more
characteristic symptoms (delusions, hallucinations, disorganized speech, grossly
disorganized or catatonic behavior, negative symptoms) for a significant portion of time
during a 1-month period, B) social/occupational dysfunction, C) duration of at least 6
months D) Schizoaffective and Mood Disorder exclusion, E) substance/general medical
condition exclusion, and F) exclusion of a relationship to a Pervasive Developmental
Disorder. (American Psychiatric Association, 2000).
Social disinterest, a Criterion A negative symptom, is considered a defining
dimension of Schizophrenia (American Psychiatric Association; World Health
Organization, 1992). Corcoran, Mercer, and Frith (1995) found that those with negative
symptoms as well as those with paranoid delusions and related positive symptoms scored
significantly lower than controls when inferring the mental states of others. In fact, social
anhedonia is thought to be a main factor in the prediction of onset in Schizophrenia
research, even when it is not associated with other dimensions of schizotypy (Gooding,
Tallent, & Matts, 2005). Others have suggested that inaccurate social perceptions persist
during remission phases and may well contribute to reemergence of psychotic symptoms
(Hyronemus, Penn, Corrigan, & Martin, 1998). In a prospective investigation, Schiffman
1

et al. (2004) observed that children who scored low on perspective taking measures were
at a higher risk of developing a Schizophrenia Spectrum Disorder than those who attained
high scores. This topic has received considerable attention from cognitive and
developmental psychologists in recent decades, leading to a nativist theory which
examines age as the dependent variable in the acquisition of perspective taking skills.
Theory of Mind
Theory of Mind (ToM) refers to the ability to attribute beliefs, intentions, or
emotions (i.e., mental states) to the self or to others in order to predict or explain their
behavior (Premack & Woodruff, 1978) and therefore plays an important role in everyday
activities that require an accurate understanding of another person’s perspective. ToM, as
put forth in the neurodevelopmental literature, postulates 5 levels (Howlin, Baron-Cohen,
& Hadwin, 1999) in understanding perspective and takes a nativist developmental
approach in explaining the acquisition of perspective taking skills via maturation (i.e., the
passage of time as the independent variable).
Levels of Theory of Mind
There are five general levels in the development of ToM ability that range from
simple visual perspective taking to predicting actions on the basis of true and false belief
(Howlin et al., 1999). As the levels represent increasing complexity, each level is
dependent on adequate performance on all previous levels. In addition, there are at least
two abilities seen to be foundational to all aspects of theory of mind; the first, mentalphysical distinction, includes the ability to identify what someone is able to do physically
(e.g., actually pet a dog) as opposed to a thought (e.g. imagining someone petting a dog).
The second basic ability is to identify distinctions between appearance and reality (e.g., a
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candle that is in the shape of an apple). Following from this foundation are the five levels
of ToM ability.
Level 1 simple visual perspective taking. People are said to act on the principle
that different individuals can have different views of the same situation or object. For
example, with a two-sided card placed between two individuals, one person can see only
one side while the other person can only see the other side. Each side of the card has a
different picture on it (e.g., ace of spades & decorative design).
Level 2 complex visual perspective taking. This is based on the principle that
people can see the same thing differently. For example, if an item is placed between two
individuals sitting opposite one another, one person will see the front of the item and the
other will see the reverse. In the language of ToM, these first two levels are collectively
referred to as first-order because they involve the simple attribution of a mental state to
another person (Baron-Cohen, 2004).
Second Order
Levels 3-5 in the development of ToM may be collectively referred to as secondorder because they involve the more complex understanding that a person can have
mental states about another person’s mental states (Baron-Cohen, Tager-Flusberg, &
Cohen, 2004).
Level 3 seeing leads to knowing. Seeing leads to knowing is based on the
principle that people only know things that they have seen (Taylor, 1988). Therefore, an
individual who cannot track what another person may or may not know is unlikely to
engage in continued social interaction, or have the ability to determine whether the other
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person is being truthful or dishonest. At level 3, a true belief is established through the
delivery of information from another source.
Level 4 true belief. This aspect extends the level 3 attribution of seeing leads to
knowing by predicting the actions of another based on the information provided by
another. The ability to engage in true belief tasks based on the rules of access (seeing or
not) are also believed to be important pre-requisites to the attribution of false belief.
Whether or not true belief as a prerequisite to false belief is actually necessary is unclear.
Level 5 false belief. False belief involves the principle that you can predict
actions on the basis of another’s false belief and can become aware that previous beliefs
may have been false (Howlin et al., 1999). In instances in which representations or
beliefs are discriminated as incorrect or false (e.g., events may have occurred without a
person’s knowledge) the individual can alter the belief about these events. In other words,
given additional information about events not experienced, individuals are able to modify
their belief such that it is in line with what has occurred. Moreover, the individual can
recognize that prior to acquiring the new information he/she was behaving on the basis of
a false belief.
ToM Applications in Perspective Taking and Schizophrenia
ToM literature suggests that people diagnosed with Schizophrenia have
difficulties in sequencing false-belief stories (Langdon et al., 1997), understanding
metaphors in proverbs (Brüne & Bodenstein, 2005), as well as ironic and metaphorical
statements (Langdon, Davies, & Coltheart, 2002; Mo, Su, Chan, & Liu, 2008),
understanding humorous pictures (Corcoran, Cahill, & Frith, 1997), and inferring
intentions (Corcoran etal., 1995; Sarfati & Hardy- Baylé, 1999). Overall, ToM research
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has suggested that people diagnosed with Schizophrenia have deficits in inferring mental
states such as the beliefs, desires, and intentions of others (perspective taking). Some
authors have considered that difficulties in perspective taking skills constitute the core
element of mental states attribution deficits in Schizophrenia (Langdon & Coltheart,
2001; Langdon, Coltheart, Ward, & Catts, 2001) and a recent meta-analysis of ToM
literature suggested that deficits may well persist during remission phases (Bora, Yucel,
& Pantelis, 2009). While the majority of research performed in this area has been
undertaken from a neurodevelopmental standpoint, recent developments in the field of
Behavior Analysis have led to inquiry from a functional contextual approach to
perspective taking (McHugh, Barnes-Holmes, & Barnes-Holmes, 2004; Villatte,
Monestès, McHugh, Freixa i Baqué, & Loas, 2010a; Weil, Hayes, & Capurro, 2011).
Relational Frame Theory
Relational Frame Theory (RFT) is a functional contextual account of human
language and cognition based on the operant scientific system put forth by B.F. Skinner.
This view approaches all behavior as being influenced by a history of antecedent and
consequential environmental stimuli which comes to bear on the current context.
Cognitive and developmental psychologists, language pathologists, and other nonbehavioral scientific fields have attempted to account for verbal behavior with mentalist
models, such as ToM, that do not serve to predict or control verbal behavior but rather, in
the end, might “allay curiosity and bring inquiry to a stop” (Skinner, 1974). Skinner
defined verbal behavior as behavior that is reinforced through the mediation of another
who is specifically trained to do so (Skinner, 1957).
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The definition of verbal behavior provided by RFT differs from that of Skinner by
requiring, in addition to Skinner’s criterion, that in order to be considered verbal, a
behavior must participate in a relational frame (Hayes, Barnes-Holmes, & Roche, 2001).
A relational frame is defined by Hayes et al. (2001, p. 33) as:
“A specific class of arbitrarily applicable relational responding
that shows the contextually controlled qualities of mutual
entailment, combinatorial mutual entailment, and transformation
of stimulus functions; is due to a history of relational responding
relevant to the contextual cues involved; and is not solely based on
direct non-relational training with regard to other particular
stimuli of interest, nor solely to nonarbitrary characteristics of
either the stimuli or the relation between them.”
Although the development of language and cognition are phenomena which are
not yet satisfactorily understood, RFT provides the tools necessary for an empirical
evaluation of complex cognitive constructs such as perspective taking.
Mutual Entailment
Relational framing begins with direct contingencies for neutral stimuli and can be
trained via operant conditioning (Törneke, 2010). That is, a neutral stimulus (B) can be
trained as functionally equivalent to another stimulus (A) by reinforcing the desired
response to a question such as “Stimulus A is the same as?” When presented with
stimulus A and asked this question in the presence of stimuli B/C/D, the participant will
choose stimulus B. What we find in addition, is that the reverse selection will also occur.
When presented with stimulus B and asked to choose its equivalent from stimuli A/C/D,
the participant will choose stimulus A although this relation has never been directly
trained. The relation from B-A is derived through mutual entailment and if we introduce
a third stimulus (C) and again train equivalence to stimulus A, we will find the same
results with A-C as we do with stimulus A-B.
6

Combinatorial Mutual Entailment.
In addition to the two relations that have been trained (A-B, A-C) and the
complementary relations, which, are in turn derived through mutual entailment (B-A, CA), a process known as combinatorial mutual entailment establishes a derived
equivalence relationship between stimulus B-C and C-B. In order for this to occur, one
must be able to take the position of stimulus B in order to understand it’s relation to
stimulus A and likewise, take the position of stimulus C in order to understand it’s
relation to stimulus A. Through combinatorial mutual entailment, if stimulus B is
equivalent to stimulus A and stimulus C is also equivalent to stimulus A, then stimulus B
and C acquire a derived equivalence relationship. Combining previously learned relations
is thought to be the basis for the development of complex human language behavior such
as metaphor and sarcasm because these processes require that a person is able to take
different perspectives (Hayes et al., 2001).

Figure 1. Components of a Relational Frame.
In review, by training two equivalence relations (A-B, A-C), four derived
equivalence relations are established (B-A, C-A, B-C, C-B). Two derived relations are
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established via mutual entailment (B-A, C-A) and two derived relations are established
via combinatorial mutual entailment (B-C, C-B). A total of six equivalence relations
develop as a result of only two directly trained equivalence relations (figure 1).
Three types of relational frames that seem to be important in the development of
language are coordination: as described in the previous equivalence example.
Opposition: the simplest relation in which some derived relations differ from the original
trained relations. If stimulus A is opposite to stimulus B and stimulus A is opposite to
stimulus C, then we can derive two relations of opposition via mutual entailment (B-A,
C-A) but also two relations of equivalence via combinatorial mutual entailment (B-C, CB). Distinction: the simplest form of relational frame in which some relations go
unspecified. If stimulus A is different than stimulus B and stimulus A is also different
than stimulus C, then two relations (B-A, C-A) are derived via mutual entailment but we
are unable to derive the remaining relations (B-C, C-B) via combinatorial mutual
entailment because the relationship between stimulus B and C remains ambiguous.
Other relational frames that might be established through derived relations are:
distinction (Roche & Barnes, 1996), comparison (Dymond & Barnes, 1995; O’Hora,
Roche, Barnes-Holmes, & Smeets, 2002), hierarchy (Griffee & Dougher, 2002), analogy
(Barnes, Hegarty, & Smeets, 1997; Lipkens & Hayes, 2009; Stewart, Barnes-Holmes, &
Roche, 2004), temporality (O’Hora, Barnes-Holmes, Roche, & Smeets, 2004; O’Hora et
al., 2002), and perspective, or deictic relational responding as it is referred to in RFT
literature (McHugh et., 2004).
Contextual cues help to predict reinforcement for particular relational responses
and there are two types of contextual cues referred to in RFT. The first is a relational cue
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or Crel (pronounced “see real”). This is a type of contextual cue that specifies the relation
between stimuli and the type of relational response that is likely to receive reinforcement.
Some examples of Crel are “equal to”, “greater than”, and “less than”. Cfunc (pronounced
“see funk”) is a type of contextual cue that specifies the stimulus functions to be
transformed in a relational frame. For example, if we say that “He is a rock”, then “is a
rock” serves as a Cfunc for the person’s stimulus functions to transform and take on certain
stimulus functions that are often paired with rocks (i.e. hard or not easily changed).
Known as metaphor, statements like this are just one example of how arbitrarily
applicable relational responding can account for complex and novel human language
extensions originally described by Skinner.
Transfer of Stimulus Functions
Using the equivalence (a frame of coordination) relation described previously as
an example, it is now possible to alter the function of each stimulus in the frame by
introducing a fourth stimulus with a different function (ex. anxiety producing) to stimuli
A, B, and C. When stimulus D, having an aversive property, is introduced and trained as
equivalent to say, stimulus B, the result is a trained aversive equivalence function
transferred from stimulus D-B and a derived aversive equivalence function between
stimuli B-D. As a result, when stimulus B again comes in contact with stimulus A or C,
the aversive function will transfer to both remaining stimuli through derived relations
(Törneke, 2010).
A Relational Frame Account of the Self and Perspective taking
In behavioral terms, the self has been described by Lattal (2012) as 1) the
collective repertoire of behavior resulting from a unique genetic and behavioral history.
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2) A specific behavioral repertoire under stimulus control, such that multiple selves may
be described. 3) A verbal response describing aspects of one’s behavioral repertoire. 4) A
dependent variable: the outcome of contingencies of reinforcement and punishment. 5)
An independent variable: a potential source of control over an individual’s behavior.
Perspective taking ability is thought to be critical to the development of the self.
In RFT, perspective taking is argued to emerge from deictic relational frames
(Barnes-Holmes, Barnes-Holmes, & Cullinan, 2001; McHugh et al., 2004). Deictic
frames are established by demonstration and cannot be traced to formal dimensions of the
environment because they are relative to the speaker (McHugh et al., 2004). That is to
say, whereas bigger/smaller relations have formal counterparts in the environment and
learning histories most likely involve a reliance on formal dimensions initially; deictic
relations do not. The primary dimensions involved are spatial, temporal, and perspective
in relation to the speaker. Each is said to emerge due to a history of asking and
responding to questions such as “What am I doing?” and “Where were you yesterday?”
While the formal characteristics of questions like these may be consistent across many
different situations, inevitably the situations themselves will vary. What is consistent
across different events are the relational properties of I-You (allocentric), Here-There
(egocentric), and Now-Then (egocentric) (McHugh et al., 2004).
These particular relational frames participate in all levels of ToM complexity. For
instance, levels 1 and 2 involve simple and complex visual perspective taking. During
relational training the principle of different people see different things is targeted. As
such, contextual control of the I-You relational frame is being established. That is, given
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a statement regarding some visual stimuli, the correct response is evoked by the
contextual cues of I and You in the statement.
Level 3 involves training on the principle of seeing leads to knowing. The
relational protocol involves continued training with the I-You relational frame to increase
the flexibility of the relational class, and indirectly targets the temporal relations of NowThen. For example, when discussing the location of an object, references to time and
personal indicators are often used as in, “I saw the key this morning (Then) so I know
(Now) where it is.” or “You did not see the key (Then) so (You) do not know (Now)
where it is.”
Relational training at level 4 involves the acquisition of contextual control of the
deictic frames. A common exemplar for true belief involves a scenario where a car is
placed beside a boat, and in another scene, an identical car is placed beside a plane. A
child is then provided with the following true belief story: “This morning, you saw the
car next to the boat but you did not see the car next to the plane”. The child is then asked,
“Where do you think the car is? Why do you think it is near the boat? Where will you go
to get the car? Why will you go to the boat?” The correct conclusions from this scenario
involve the knowledge that one will only know what one has seen, and will act on this
basis. Although Levels 3 and 4 of understanding informational states appear to cover the
attribution of true belief to the self and others, these abilities are also believed to be
important pre-requisites to the attribution of false belief (Howlin et al., 1999).
Level 5 involves further training on the complexity and flexibility of deictic
relational frames involving false belief tasks. The principle covered here involves
predicting actions on the basis of false belief as well as becoming aware that previous
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beliefs may have been false and thus providing the context to alter the previous response
to a true belief. Accomplishment of these tasks requires an appreciation that observation
from a specified perspective may change when seen from another perspective. As
previously mentioned, all require observations made from a specified perspective or point
of view, defined by person, place, and time. From an RFT point of view, that sense of
perspective is the result of deictic frames along those three dimensions (I-You, HereThere, Now-Then).
Relational Frame Applications in Perspective Taking
Based on the Barnes-Holmes et al. (2001) perspective taking protocol, McHugh et
al. (2004) developed a shortened protocol in order to assess the acquisition of skills via
the deictic relations of I-You, Here-There and Now-Then. Relations were assessed in
simple, reversed, and double reversed tasks across 56 (originally 256) total trials. The
study determined that accuracy on deictic perspective taking tasks increased as a function
of age (3-5 years (early childhood); 6-8 years (middle childhood); 9-11 years (late
childhood); 12-14 years (adolescence); and 18–30 years (adulthood)) and that levels of
accuracy appeared to decrease as a function of relational complexity. Overall,
participants performed with higher levels of accuracy in simple deictic trials when
compared to reversed trials. The findings from this and subsequent studies support ToM
literature which designates age as the independent variable in the acquisition of
perspective taking skills, acting on the basis of true/false belief (McHugh, BarnesHolmes, & Barnes-Holmes, 2003b), and acting for the purpose of deception (McHugh,
Barnes-Holmes, & Barnes-Holmes, 2003c).
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Proponents of RFT have since developed deictic relational responding training
that has been shown to accelerate the development of these repertoires in typically
developing children (McHugh, Barnes-Holmes, & Barnes-Holmes, 2003a). Rehfeldt,
Dillen, Ziomek, and Kowalchuk (2007) also suggested that two typically functioning
children ages 9 and 10 acquired perspective taking skills through reinforced multiple
exemplars. A limitation to the study was that the researchers did not assess external
validity in generalizing to novel tasks. The study was also the first to show that children
with high-functioning Autism Spectrum Disorders scored lower on each level of deictic
perspective taking through an automated Barnes-Holmes protocol. Heagle and Rehfeldt
(2006), utilized an extended and automated version of the Barnes-Holmes protocol to
reinforce three normal functioning children of ages 6, 8, and 11 years to generalize
simple, reversed, and double-reversed perspective taking to real world stimuli and
responses. In addition, Weil et al. (2011) demonstrated that deictic relational frames can
be shaped as operant behavior in typically functioning children age 4-5 years and that
reversed and double-reversed perspective taking acquisition correlated with increases in
scoring on the ToM false-belief Deceptive Container Task. This was the first relational
frame study to asses ToM task performance as a pre/post-training measure.
The literature suggests that when deficits in deictic perspective taking tasks are
found, acquisition may be facilitated through reinforced multiple exemplar training.
Moreover, these findings have encouraged research in the area of Schizophrenia by
suggesting that perspective taking skills might be remediated in the same fashion.
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Deictic Relations and Schizophrenia
In a series of studies performed by Villatte et al. (2008, 2010a, 2010b), the
McHugh et al. (2004) protocol was employed to determine if persons with high levels of
Social Anhedonia and Schizophrenia exhibit deficits in deictic perspective taking tasks.
Villatte et al. (2008) utilized an automated version of the McHugh et al. (2004)
protocol to assess relational responding in 30 nonclinical young adults (age 18-21) with
high levels of Social Anhedonia. The protocol included 62 trials, each of which differed
from the others depending on the deictic relation it addressed (I-You, Here-There or
Now-Then) and the level of relational complexity assigned (8 simple, 36 reversed, and 18
double reversed) for a total of eight trial-types (simple I-You, simple Here-There, simple
Now-Then, reversed I-You, reversed Here-There, reversed Now-Then, double reversed IYou/Here-There, double reversed Here-There/Now-Then). Villatte et al. found that
socially anhedonic participants scored lower than a control group on the more complex
(double-reversed) relational responding tasks which involved the deictic relation of I-You
and that performance on the deictic relational responding protocol predicted accuracy on
an established ToM exercise which involves identifying the intent of indirect speech
known as the Hinting Task (see Corcoran et al., 1995).
Villatte et al. (2010a), study 1, employed a protocol consisting of 48 true/false
ToM trials in order to assess deficits in attributing a belief to the self or to another (12
true-belief for self, 12 false-belief for self, 12 true-belief for another, 12 false-belief for
another) in 30 first-year Psychology students with Social Anhedonia. The study found
that those with scores at or above two standard deviations on the Revised Social
Anhedonia Scale (RSAS) (Eckblad, Chapman, Chapman, & Mishlove, 1982) performed
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more poorly than controls on relational responding tasks that involved reversing the IYou frame when attributing a belief (true or false) to another. Overall, experimental
participants produced 75% more errors on true-belief (ToM level 4) tasks and 300% more
errors on false-belief tasks (ToM level 5). No differences were found between groups on
tasks that involved attribution of a belief to the self. These findings support those of
Villatte et al. (2008) in that participants with high levels of Social Anhedonia appeared to
exhibit deficits in taking the perspective of another during complex deictic relational
responding tasks.
Villatte et al. (2010a), study 2, compared performance, on the same tasks as study
1, by 15 patients (ages 22-53) diagnosed with Schizophrenia according to ICD-10 (World
Health Organization, 1992). The number of tasks was reduced by half as compared to
study 1 due to hospitalization constraints and resulted in 24 true/false trials for the
purpose of assessing deficits in attributing a belief to another or to the self (6 true-belief
for self, 6 false-belief for self, 6 true-belief for another, 6 false-belief for another). The
study reported that experimental participants scored lower than controls in tasks that
required attributing belief to another (reversal of I-You frame) and were less accurate in
attribution of a false-belief (as compared to true-belief) to the self or another (supporting
ToM reports by Brune, 2005 & Sprong, Schothorst, Vos, Hox, & Van Engeland, 2007).
In contrast, accuracy of controls did not differ across trial-types. Response latencies were
also assessed and resulted in the finding that subjects with high levels of Social
Anhedonia were as fast in responding to the tasks as control subjects. This finding
suggests that impulsivity, often exhibited by people with Schizophrenia, is unlikely to
account for increased levels of error on perspective taking tasks in this population. This
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also suggests that neuroleptic medication side effects did not have a significant effect on
subject’s performance in perspective taking. It is also unlikely that memory deficits
account for increased errors on longer tasks because tasks were left on screen for as long
as participants needed. These findings lend further support to the hypothesis that high
levels of Social Anhedonia lead to less practice in perspective taking and thus, deficits
emerge. It is also quite possible that Social Anhedonia is reinforced by its consequences,
thus exacerbating the condition. While Villatte et al. found that deficits in attributing a
false belief to the self were present in patients with Schizophrenia (study 2), the same did
not apply to those with Social Anhedonia alone (study 1). This finding suggests that low
levels of social interaction can be implicated in the impairment of understanding
another’s point of view but perhaps not in the understanding that people can act on the
basis of a false-belief.
In a study published the same year, Villatte et al. (2010b) assessed relational
responding in 15 patients (ages 22-53) diagnosed with Schizophrenia, according to ICD10 (World Health Organization, 1992). The protocol included 42 trials, each of which
again differed from the others depending on the deictic relation it addressed and the level
of relational complexity (8 simple, 20 reversed, and 14 double reversed) assigned. This
study found that the experimental group scored significantly lower than the control group
on all reversed trial types (I-You, Here-There, Now-Then). While the experimental group
also scored lower on double-reversed trials, the deficit fell short of significance, although,
it was hypothesized that significance would have been reached with a larger sample size.
Similar to the findings of Villatte et al. (2008) performance on the deictic relational
responding protocol again predicted accuracy on the ToM Hinting Task.
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The current study trained deictic relational responding in 3 people diagnosed with
Schizophrenia and mild-moderate Mental Retardation and the study took place at a local
behavioral services company in Tampa, Florida. Once consent had been obtained,
participants completed the Revised Social Anhedonia Scale and then tested for deficits in
deictic relational responding and an attempt to remediate these skills then occurred
through reinforced multiple exemplar training. The Deceptive Container Task (levels 4
and 5) and the Hinting Task were employed as baseline ToM probes as well as posttraining probes for skill remediation. This study is the first in the deictic relational
responding literature to utilize a single-subject analysis to attempt remediation of
perspective taking skills in Schizophrenia and also the first to address such deficits in a
population of clients with mild-moderate Mental Retardation.
Method
Participants
Screening confirmed that each of the 3 participants selected for the study met the
following inclusion criteria: 1) a current diagnosis of Schizophrenia, 2) a diagnosis of
mild-moderate Mental Retardation, 3) high scores on the Revised Social Anhedonia
Scale, 4) deficits on the ToM tasks, and 5) deficits in deictic relational responding.
Participant #1 was a 66 year old male who had diagnoses of Schizophrenia,
Bipolar manic with psychotic features, and Mental Retardation. Prescription drugs related
to these diagnoses were Abilify (atypical antipsychotic) and Carbamazepine
(anticonvulsant/mood stabilizing). He had a long history of engaging in inappropriate
sexual behavior towards children and vulnerable adults. Participant #2 was a 49 year old
male diagnosed with Schizophrenia with auditory hallucinations and Mental Retardation.
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Prescription drugs related to these diagnoses were Zyprexia and Risperdal (atypical
antipsychotics). He had a history of engaging in inappropriate sexual behavior toward
adult females. Participant #3 was a 47 year old male diagnosed with Schizophrenia with
bizarre vocalizations and Mental Retardation. Prescription drugs related to these
diagnoses were Zyprexia (atypical antipsychotic), Haldol (typical antipsychotic), Luvox
(SSRI), and Depakote (anticonvulsant/mood stabilizing). He had a history of engaging in
inappropriate sexual verbalizations toward adult females.
Following screening, an explanation of the relational responding protocol was
provided to each potential participant in language appropriate for functioning level and a
review period of 24 hours was allowed before obtaining written informed consent from
each. Ongoing assessment of consent was performed before the onset of each study
session and participants were made aware that they may opt out of the study at any time
and that this choice would have no affect on their regular treatment. Participants did not
receive any form of monetary compensation.
Setting
Study sessions were conducted in private closed-door rooms at each of the client’s
homes or Adult Day Training (ADT) facility. The rooms varied in size across client
homes but contained at least two chairs and one table. Participants sat facing the
experimenter in order to facilitate training and every attempt was made to avoid
interruptions.
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Design
A within-subject multiple probe design was combined with a multiple baseline
across behaviors design which allowed for evaluation of acquisition across levels of
deictic relational complexity (Simple, Reversed, and Double Reversed relations).
Data Collection
Sessions were approximately 10 minutes in duration, attempted twice daily, and
were typically conducted on Mondays, Wednesdays, and Fridays. Study duration ranged
from 8-10 weeks per participant. Data were reported as the percentage of correct
responses per session and were calculated by dividing correct trials by total trials and
multiplying by 100. Interobserver Agreement (IOA) was conducted by a master’s level
graduate student via audio recordings of sessions. IOA percentage was calculated on a
trial by trial basis by dividing the number of trials with agreement by the number of trials
with agreement plus disagreement, then multiplying by 100. IOA was calculated across
33.1% of all sessions (including 33.3% of post-training probes) and resulted in 95.8%
agreement.
Procedures
Testing and Training
Each participant was exposed to the same order of testing and training. The
general course and sequence of the study progressed from baseline assessments to
intervention training with post-training probes conducted before advancing to higher
complexity tasks:
1. Baseline probes
 Revised Social Anhedonia Scale
 ToM (Deceptive Container & Hinting Tasks)
 RFT (All deictic complexity levels)
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2. Deictic training (Simple level)
 Post deictic training probes
 Mastery (Simple)
 Baseline (Reversed and Double Reversed)
3. Deictic training (Reversed level)
 Post deictic training probes
 Mastery (Simple and Reversed)
 Baseline (Double Reversed)
 1st post-training ToM probes (Deceptive Container & Hinting
Tasks)
 Revised Social Anhedonia Scale
4. Deictic training (Double Reversed level)
 Post deictic training probe
 Mastery (All complexity levels)
 2nd post-training (Deceptive Container & Hinting Tasks)
 Revised Social Anhedonia Scale
Theory of Mind testing. Levels four and five theory of mind testing consisted of
32 scenarios with accompanying true/false questions. These scenarios were read to
participants from note cards in random order. Scenarios were modeled around the ToM
Deceptive Container Task used by Villatte et al. (2010a) and were divided equally into 4
categories: true belief attribution to oneself, false belief attribution to oneself, true belief
attribution to another, and finally, false belief attribution to another. An equal number of
true and false answers for each type of attribution were maintained. Three object sets
appeared in the scenarios: a cigarette pack and crayons, a crayon box and cigarettes, and
a chalk box and pencils. These items were selected in order to allow for false belief (level
5) questions because one would normally expect to find cigarettes in a cigarette box,
crayons in a crayon box, and chalk in a chalk box. For example, the following scenario
was read to participants from a note card:
“If I put the pencils in a chalk box and you are not here,
you would think the chalk box contains chalk”
Participants then received a prompt to answer “true” or “false”.
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The preceding example is one of false belief attribution to oneself because, being absent
from the setting, the participant would normally expect to find chalk in a chalk box and
so the correct answer to the question is true. Answering this question correctly requires
knowing that one can act in accordance with false beliefs.
The ToM Hinting Task was modeled on that employed by Corcoran et al. (1995)
and Villatte et al. (2010b) to assess ToM impairments in Schizophrenia. Ten short scenes
were read to each participant. Each scene described an interaction between two characters
in a socially relevant everyday situation and the participant was then asked to clarify what
he believed the character meant by what was said in each interaction. For example:
“Stephanie says to her friend Nicole: ‘I can’t afford the repairs of
my car. Could you lend me some money?’ Nicole answers: ‘I have
to have my car repaired too.’”
The participant was then asked:
“What does Nicole really mean when she says this?”
A second hint was then provided regardless of the answer to the first hint:
“Nicole then says: The repairs to my car are going to be very
expensive.”
The participant was again asked:
“What does Nicole really mean when she says this?”
Participants were able to score a maximum of 3 points per scenario (2 points for a correct
first answer, 1 point for a correct second answer, and 0 points for an incorrect answer).
The previously mentioned studies employed this cue and second opportunity to
answer in an attempt to avoid a floor effect in participants who find the task difficult.
Participants in the Villatte et al. (2010b) study produced correct answers after the first
question on 63% of trials (77% after the cue and 2nd question) and therefore, a floor effect
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was not anticipated in this study. In addition, previous control and experimental
participants benefited equally from this supplemental information. Despite these data, the
current study also incorporated a cue and an additional question in order to maintain
uniformity.
Deictic relational testing and training. The protocol used in the current study
consisted of the shortened perspective taking protocol employed in the developmental
profile of perspective taking reported by McHugh et al. (2004). The protocol consisted of
fifty six perspective taking tasks that target responding in accordance with the three
perspective taking frames of I-You, Here-There and Now-Then across three levels of
complexity (Simple, Reversed, & Double Reversed). Specifics of baseline probes,
instructional probes and post reinforcement probes are discussed below.
This experiment made use of a table top procedure that necessarily included a
limited set of stimuli. The importance of utilizing a limited set of stimuli was to ensure
acquisition in a timely fashion and to evaluate whether limited multiple exemplars would
promote generality of complex relational responding. That is, utilizing small samples of
stimuli in each type of relational frame should function to establish a relational operant.
Each of the specific statements was presented by the researcher and read from an indexsized card. The correct answer was in parenthesis and printed at 20% grayscale to
minimize the chance that the participant was able to see it.
Pre-instructional testing procedures. All pre-instructional probes (baseline)
contained a random presentation of all three deictic relational frames across all three
complexity levels. A total of 18 trials (6 per complexity level) were included. The testing
procedure was conducted without feedback and in the absence of reinforcement. As the
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design employed in this study was a multiple probe baseline design across levels of
complexity, baseline testing sessions were conducted throughout on complexity levels
that were not yet involved in training. Whenever this occurred, only deictic relational
frames from those complexity levels not yet involved in training were evaluated. For
example, given that training was in progress at the simple complexity level and a baseline
probe was conducted—that baseline probe included trials comprised of deictic relational
frames from the Reversed and Double Reversed levels of complexity only (total of 12
trials).
Training procedures. As previously mentioned, the study employed a table-top
procedure that included various questions read from cards (by the experimenter) which
made reference to the deictic relational frames involved. All training sessions included 12
trials of the deictic frames at the respective complexity level randomly presented to the
participant. Exceptions to this occurred when a participant required training on one
specific deictic frame. Responses to these 12 trials produced reinforcement (social
positive) or extinction + general feedback (“no, I’m sorry, I would be in the blue chair”).
Two sessions were conducted during the vast majority of days with a break in between.
Therefore, each day, a maximum of two sessions was implemented. The decision to
continue past the first session was left to the participants. Mastery criterion during the
training phase for any relational frame was 80%.
During training, the protocol did not include randomized presentations of
complexity level, but did include mixed trials involving the three deictic relations at a
particular complexity level. Specifically, the training protocol was divided into the three
levels of relational complexity (Simple, Reversed and Double Reversed relations), within

23

which trials took two forms: first, given adequate performance on all deictic relational
frames, each session involved 12 trials (4 I-You, 4 Here-There, 4 Now-Then). Second, at
any point that it became clear the participant was struggling with one of the deictic
relational frames, that frame was mass trialed (e.g., 12 trials of only Now-Then) and
recombined with the other deictic relational frames as the participant mastered the
material.
Complexity level 1 involved responding in accordance with the perspective taking
frames of I-You, Here-There, and Now-Then in simple presentations where the questions
were focused on the relational frame as presented. To illustrate, if the trial involved the
relational frame of I-You, stimuli were placed on the table and the questions were asked
with respect to that particular frame and were presented such as:
“I (Experimenter) have a green brick, and you (participant) have a
red brick”.
The participant was then asked:
“Which brick do I have? Which brick do you have?”
The order in which the I-You, Here-There, and Now-Then questions are presented was
randomized across all trials in a training block.
Complexity level 2 was procedurally the same as level 1; however, after stating
the vignette and prior to asking the questions, the trainer provided a contextual cue which
altered the correct response. To use the same example as above:
“I have a green brick, and you have a red brick.”
Contextual Cue
“If I was you and you were me.”
“Which brick would I have? Which brick would you have?”
In the statement “If I was you and you were me”, the I-You relation is explicitly reversed.
Correct responses to these questions were based on this relational reversal and not on the
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actual possession of the bricks. In other words, the correct answers to the questions are "a
red brick" (Experimenter) and "a green brick" (subject), respectively. This reversal was
included in each of the relational frames.
Complexity level 3 involved trials of the same type as described in the first two
levels of complexity, however, each trial only included two of the three relations and both
relations were reversed in each trial. In other words, the two separate trial types in this
level consisted of either I-You/Here-There or Here-There/Now-Then combinations. Both
of which were reversed by a contextual cue of:
“If I am You and You are Me and If Now was Then and Then was
Now.”
This resulted in answers to Level 3 questions that were the same as those seen in Level 1
(simple). That is, if you reverse an I-You relation and a Here-There relation, the response
is the same as if the relations were not reversed at all.
“I am here in the green chair and you are there in the yellow
chair.”
“And if I am you and you are me and if here is there and there is
here.”
“What chair are you in? What chair am I in?”
The double reversed level of complexity evaluated 2 combinations of relational frames (IYou/Here-There and Here-There/Now-Then).
Post-instructional testing procedures. Following mastery of the deictic relational
frames at any level of complexity, the participant was presented with trials containing
deictic relational frames from the level of complexity just mastered randomly rotated
with deictic frames from levels that had been previously mastered. That is, given mastery
at the reversed level of complexity, a post-instructional probe included relational frames
from both the simple (previously mastered) and the reversed levels of complexity. The
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participant was presented with 12 trials, randomly rotated that included questions from
both the simple and reversed complexity levels; when conducted following acquisition of
double reversed relations, the post-instructional probe included 18 randomly rotated trials
from all levels of complexity (6 Simple, 6 Reversed, 6 Double-Reversed). Continuation
of training into the next level of complexity required that the participant perform at 80%
accuracy or better on unprompted, unreinforced probes.
Programmed consequences. Each trial in the relational testing and training
protocol included two questions (e.g., "Where am I sitting? Where are you sitting?"). A
correct response required that the participant answer both questions correctly. A correct
response to the trial (i.e., answering both questions correctly) resulted in the delivery of
praise. Participants could earn a preferred reinforcer, as identified through self report, for
meeting mastery criteria (80% correct responding). Participants #1 and 2 identified
edibles (a box of ice cream bars & large can of ice tea, respectively) and Participant #3
identified tangibles in the form of restrictive clothing (sports gear and rehabilitation
braces) as his preferred reinforcer. Incorrect responses resulted in short and concise
corrective feedback or 5s extinction for bizarre vocalizations.
Results
Deficits in perspective taking were observed in all 3 participants on baseline ToM
Deceptive Container Tasks including false belief attribution to oneself, true belief
attribution to oneself, false belief attribution to another, true belief attribution to another,
and the Hinting Task. Deficits were also indicated on all levels of deictic tasks (Simple,
Reversed and Double Reversed) at baseline. Reinforced multiple exemplar training
occurred for specific deictic relational tasks, at specific levels of complexity, and resulted
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in increased accuracy in complex deictic relational responding. Finally, increased
accuracy on all ToM tasks was observed across all participants after training at each
complexity level of deictic relational responding. ToM task performance increases
provide evidence to support the notion that training involving a limited set of stimuli can
strengthen deictic relations as generalized operants and that deictic relational responding
constitutes the foundation for perspective taking ability.
Participant #1
Baseline scores for Participant #1 were first evaluated and yielded the following
aggregate data: 50% (Simple), 50% (Reversed), and 17% (Double-Reversed). A second
assessment of baseline performance yielded identical percentages. Training on Simple
relations started with session three and continued for 12 sessions. Both I-You and HereThere relations were quickly acquired by Participant #1, however, Now-Then relations
were difficult and required mass trial sessions. A post-instructional probe was conducted
and resulted in 83% performance across the three Simple deictic relations.
After training for Simple relations, a baseline probe was conducted for both
Reversed and Double Reversed relations. There was a decrease in Reversed performance
to 33% (2/6). Performance on Double-Reversal trials was shown to increase slightly to
33% (2/6).
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Figure 2. Deictic Training Participant #1
Training at the Reversed level of complexity commenced following the third
baseline probe and continued for 12 sessions. As aggregate performance met criteria for
80% or better to be probed, a post-instructional probe was conducted that resulted in
100% correct responding.
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Figure 3. Deceptive Container Task Participant #1
Following this probe, a final baseline was conducted with Double-Reversed
relations. Relations at this level tested at 17% accuracy (1/6). Training on these two
relations resulted in increased accurate responding at 92% (11/12). A post-instructional
probe was conducted and Participant #1 responded at 100% (Simple), 67% (Reversed)
and 75% (Double-Reversed). As a result, a return to the Reversed level tasks was deemed
appropriate per protocol. Upon two consecutive Reversed level training sessions at 100%
accuracy, a post-instructional probe was scored at 100% (Simple), 83% (Reversed), and
17% (Double-Reversed). Figure 2 shows the results of deictic training for participant #1.

Figure 4. Hinting Task & RSAS Assessments Participant #1
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Theory of Mind probes were conducted on three occasions (Baseline, PostReversed, and Post-Double-Reversed). Evaluation of levels 4 (true belief) and 5 (false
belief) were compared by employing the Deceptive Container Task and further
generalization was assessed by examining performance on the Hinting Task. On the first
ToM probe, Participant #1’s ToM performance was 67% (82% at level 4 and 51% at
level 5) across Deceptive Container Tasks and 40% on the Hinting Task. Following
acquisition of Reversed deictic relations a second ToM probe was conducted with ToM
accuracy increasing to 88% (94% at level 4 and 82% at level 5) across Deceptive
Container Tasks and 50% on the Hinting Task. A final ToM probe was conducted
following the post-instructional mastery probe performance. Participant #1’s aggregate
ToM accuracy was 94% (100% at level 4 and 88% at level 5) across Deceptive Container
Tasks and 63% on the Hinting Task. Figure 3 shows the results of Deceptive Container
Task probes for participant #1.
Finally, RSAS probes were also conducted on the same schedule as those
performed for ToM and resulted in scores of 20/40 (Baseline), 14/40 (Post-Reversed),
and 9/40 (Post-Double-Reversed). Figure 4 shows the results of Hinting Task and RSAS
probes for participant #1.
Participant #2
Baseline scores for Participant #2 were first evaluated and yielded the following
aggregate data: 33% (Simple), 67% (Reversed), and 33% (Double-Reversed). A second
assessment of baseline performance yielded similar percentages: 33% (Simple), 67%
(Reversed), and 33% (Double-Reversed). Training on Simple relations started with
session three and continued for 6 sessions. Both I-You and Here-There relations were
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quickly acquired by Participant #2, however, Now-Then relations were difficult and
required a mass trial session. A post-instructional probe was conducted and resulted in
83% performance across the three Simple deictic relations.

Figure 5. Deictic Training Participant #2
After training for Simple relations, a baseline probe was conducted for both
Reversed and Double Reversed relations. There was a decrease in Reversed performance
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to 50% (3/6). Performance on Double-Reversal trials was shown to increase slightly to
67% (4/6).

Figure 6. Deceptive Container Task Participant #2
Training at the Reversed level of complexity commenced following the third
baseline probe and continued for 8 sessions. As aggregate performance met criteria for
80% or better to be probed, a post-instructional probe was conducted that resulted in
100% correct responding. Figure 5 shows the results of deictic training for participant #2.
Following this probe, a final baseline was conducted with Double-Reversed
relations. Relations at this level tested at 17% accuracy (1/6). Training on these relations
resulted in increased accurate responding at 83% (10/12). A post-instructional probe was
conducted and Participant #2 responded at 100% (Simple), 67% (Reversed) and 67%
(Double-Reversed). As a result, a return to the Reversed level tasks was deemed
appropriate per protocol. Mass trial training of the Now-Then relation at the Reversed
level was conducted until criterion was met. Double-Reversed training again occurred to
criterion and a post-instructional probe was scored at 100% (Simple), 100% (Reversed),
and 83% (Double-Reversed). Figure 6 shows the results of Deceptive Container Task
probes for participant #2.
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Figure 7. Hinting Task & RSAS Assessments Participant #2
Theory of Mind probes were conducted on three occasions (Baseline, PostReversed, and Post-Double-Reversed). Evaluation of levels 4 (true belief) and 5 (false
belief) were compared by employing the Deceptive Container Task and further
generalization was assessed by examining performance on the Hinting Task. On the first
ToM probe, Participant #2’s performance was 73% (57% at level 4 and 88% at level 5)
across Deceptive Container Tasks and 43% on the Hinting Task. Following acquisition of
Reversed deictic relations a second ToM probe was conducted with ToM accuracy
increasing to 85% (82% at level 4 and 88% at level 5) across Deceptive Container Tasks
and 50% on the Hinting Task. A final ToM probe was conducted following the postinstructional mastery probe performance. Participant #2’s aggregate ToM accuracy was
82% (82% at level 4 and 82% at level 5) across Deceptive Container Tasks and 77% on
the Hinting Task.
Finally, RSAS probes were also conducted on the same schedule as those
performed for ToM and resulted in scores of 19/40 (Baseline), 16/40 (Post-Reversed),
and 18/40 (Post-Double-Reversed). Figure 7 shows the results Hinting Task and RSAS
probes for participant #2.
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Participant #3
Baseline scores for Participant #3 were first evaluated and yielded the following
aggregate data: 67% (Simple), 17% (Reversed), and 0% (Double-Reversed). A second
assessment of baseline performance yielded the following percentages: 0% (Simple),
17% (Reversed), and 17% (Double-Reversed). A third assessment was performed due to
the variability between the first and second assessments. The third assessment yielded the
following percentages: 17% (Simple), 0% (Reversed), and 0% (Double-Reversed).
Training on Simple relations started with session three and continued for 3 sessions. A
post-instructional probe was conducted and resulted in 100% performance across the
three Simple deictic relations.
After training for Simple relations, a baseline probe was conducted for both
Reversed and Double Reversed relations. There was an increase in Reversed performance
to 33% (2/6). Performance on Double-Reversal trials was shown to increase to 50%
(3/6). Figure 8 shows the results of deictic training for participant #3.
Training at the Reversed level of complexity commenced following the fourth
baseline probe and continued for 4 sessions. As aggregate performance met criteria for
80% or better to be probed, a post-instructional probe was conducted that resulted in 0%
(Simple) and 67% (Reversed) correct responding. As a result, a return to the Simple level
tasks was deemed appropriate per protocol. Criterion was met within one session.
Reversed training again occurred to criterion and a post-instructional probe was scored at
100% (Simple) and 100% (Reversed).

34

Figure 8. Deictic Training Participant #3
Following this probe, a final baseline was conducted with Double-Reversed
relations. Relations at this level tested at 33% accuracy (1/6). Training on these relations
increased performance to 67% but mastery was not met due to the participant’s early
withdrawal from the study. Figure 9 shows the results of Deceptive Container Task
probes for participant #3.
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Figure 9. Deceptive Container Task Assessments Participant #3
Theory of Mind probes were conducted on two occasions (Baseline and PostReversed). Evaluation of levels 4 (true belief) and 5 (false belief) were compared by
employing the Deceptive Container Task and further generalization was assessed by
examining performance on the Hinting Task. On the first ToM probe, Participant #3’s
performance was 47% (75% at level 4 and 19% at level 5) across Deceptive Container
Tasks and 23% on the Hinting Task. Following acquisition of Reversed deictic relations a
second ToM probe was conducted with ToM accuracy increasing to 60% (75% at level 4
and 44% at level 5) across Deceptive Container Tasks and 47% on the Hinting Task. A
final ToM and Hinting task probe could not be conducted due to the participant’s early
withdrawal from the study.
Finally, RSAS probes were also conducted on the same schedule as those
performed for ToM and resulted in scores of 22/40 (Baseline) and 20/40 (Post-Reversed).
Figure 10 shows the results of Hinting Task and RSAS probes for participant #3.
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Figure 10. Hinting Task & RSAS Assessments Participant #3
Discussion
Within subject analyses indicated that the deictic relations believed to be the basic
units of perspective taking ability can be shaped through operant conditioning to various
levels of complexity in 3 males diagnosed with Schizophrenia. Performance by all
participants increased when training was implemented.
Post-instructional probes involved stimuli that were not directly trained during the
training phases of any level of complexity. These probes were intended to assess for
generalization. In the ToM literature, generalization is discussed in terms of near and far
generalization. Near generalization refers to generalization across materials and far
generalization to that shown across setting/testing style, and materials. The focus of this
study was on the hypothesized underlying relational abilities that contribute to far
generalization. That is, we were attempting to directly impact perspective taking ability
through its hypothesized foundation - deictic relational responding. This was a test of far
generalization in that the Deceptive Container (ToM levels 4 &5) and Hinting Tasks were
presented in an entirely different format than that of the multiple exemplar tasks (deictic
relations) during training.
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All participants showed evidence of improvement on ToM tasks. With the
increased flexibility in relational repertoire given mastery at the Reversed level,
improvements are seen at level 4 for participants #1 and #2 while improvement was seen
at level 5 for participants #1 and #3. Improvements were seen for all 3 participants on the
Hinting Task. As the participants’ relational repertoire expanded through training on
Double Reversed relations, participant #1 showed improvement in levels 4 and 5.
Participant #2 showed no improvement at level 4 and perhaps a very slight decrease at
level 5. Double Reversed probes were not conducted for participant #3 due to early
withdrawal from the study. Improvements were seen for participants #1 and #2 on the
Hinting Task once again.
A point of interest with regards to particular deictic frames is that, in contrast to
the findings of Villatte et al. (2008) none of the participants in this study appeared to
exhibit differential deficits on frames involving I-You relations and yet, 2 participants
met criteria (a score of 20+ points) on the RSAS, the third falling only 1 point short. In
support of the Villatte et al. study, all 3 participants showed Hinting Task scores that
correlated negatively with RSAS scores as deictic responding met mastery criteria at
increasing levels of complexity. An interesting abstraction from the procedure showed
that all participants did have difficulty with the temporal (Now-Then) relation. These
were the only trials in which the stimuli in the scenario (Today-Yesterday) differed from
the stimuli in the questions (Now-Then). ‘Now’ and ‘today’ are typically in a frame of
coordination as are ‘then’ and ‘yesterday’ but it is possible that these frames of
coordination were not adequately established in the repertoires of participants prior to the
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study. Future studies should consider assessing this prerequisite skill and training their
coordination if necessary.
In contrast to Villatte et al. (2010a), participant #2 scored higher on false belief
(ToM level 5) tasks than on true belief (ToM level 4) tasks. Interestingly, this participant
also scored higher on reversed deictic relations than he did on simple relations. Although
this phenomenon was recorded for only one subject, these data suggest that the
presentation of perspective taking deficits in people with Schizophrenia may differ from
other populations such as ASD. Further research with larger sample sizes might consider
addressing this hypothesis. The current study lends support to Villatte et al. (2010b) in
that performance on the deictic relational protocol predicted performance on the Hinting
Task. Overall, the findings of this study support the notion that in people diagnosed with
Schizophrenia, deictic relational responding is predictive of performance on traditional
ToM tasks including the Deceptive Container Task and Hinting Task.
Limitations
An important variable to consider in a study such as this is maturation. The
multiple probe design utilized in this study does so by showing reliable changes in the
level and trend of the data following an intervention on one particular behavior or relation
(Simple relations) while showing no change, little change, or trending in the opposite
direction of the other behaviors/relations of interest (Reversed and Double Reversed
relations). Given that probe data for Reversed and Double Reversed relations do not show
an intervention effect during baseline, another comparison between data series is possible
when the intervention is applied to each subsequent behavior. If the data again respond to
the application of the intervention, then there is strong support for functional control.
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The data generally provide support for functional control within subjects. It is
possible, however, that a test/re-test effect was observed since the ToM tests were
identical across three administrations. Appendices III and IV shows examples of the ToM
and Hinting Task protocols. Taking the test a second and third time might show
improvement as a result of the effect of taking the test previously (Kazdin, 2003). The
vignettes were similar across all tests, which could increase this effect. There is also the
possibility that, because of the nature of Schizophrenia, participants’ responses may have
been affected by improved rapport throughout the study. Future studies should consider
the effect of test-retest on the ToM measures collected.
Rehfeldt et al. (2007) showed very rapid acquisition of double reversed relations
as compared to fairly lengthy training phases for the single reversed relations. It is
possible that these results could occur if the participant is not responding relationally but
rather simply following a rule. The use of randomly rotated questions from all levels of
complexity (only those previously mastered) during post-instructional probes was used as
a means to reduce the chance that participants would simply follow a rule or respond to
the direct discriminative aspects of the vocal statements and echo them. A second
measure was implemented in order to further reduce the chance that participants were
following a rule. During Double-Reversed training participants were required to respond
correctly at both Simple and Reversed levels before the Double-Reversed level was
presented. This process functioned not only to maintain the previously mastered levels of
responding but to set the occasion for a second reversal of deictic frames at the Double
Reversed level of responding.
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A final limitation to this study is that all 3 participants had a dual diagnosis of
Schizophrenia and mild-moderate Mental Retardation. The extent to which each of these
diagnoses contributed to the perspective taking ability of participants remains unclear.
Further research might target participants diagnosed with a Schizophrenia Spectrum
Disorder who do not have a concurrent diagnosis of Mental Retardation.
Conclusion
Few studies to date have attempted to operationalize perspective taking in the
behavioral literature and only a handful have targeted changes in deictic relational
deficits. The only published studies to date that incorporate the McHugh protocol in a
training situation (Heagle & Rehfeldt, 2006; Rehfeldt et al., 2007; Weil et al., 2011) have
done so with a population of typically developing children (4-11 years). The present
study is the first to target these skills in people diagnosed with Schizophrenia and Mental
Retardation. Furthermore, previous studies did not conduct assessment of Hinting Task
performance after deictic training, so the relationship between performance on the
Hinting Task and improvement in deictic relational responding was unclear. The results
of this study suggest that improvements in performance on the Hinting Task may have
been influenced by training on the deictic relational protocol. That is, these data provide
experimental support for the notion that deictic relational frames are a necessary
component in the remediation of perspective taking ability in people diagnosed with
Schizophrenia.
Finally, future studies should address the role of perspective taking in other
behaviors commonly associated with Schizophrenia such as delusions and hallucinations.
It is possible that a weak perspective taking ability has some mediating and/or
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moderating effect on the development of delusions and hallucinations. For example, in
the case of auditory hallucinations, a person is unable to accurately identify the source
and believability of their own covert verbal behavior. Training on deictic relational
responding might be expanded to address this and other behavioral deficits and excesses
commonly associated with Schizophrenia Spectrum Disorders. Specific to the
participants in this study, it is also possible that long term deictic training may have some
effect on sex offenders’ understanding of their victim’s traumatic experience and may
serve as an abolishing operation for inappropriate sexual behaviors. The long term
implications of remediation are the eventual reduction or discontinuation of antipsychotic
medication regimens and reintegration of people with Schizophrenia as typically
functioning members of society.
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Appendix I-Deictic Relational Protocol
The Perspective taking Protocol to be employed in this experiment. The correct response
for each question is shown in parentheses. (Adapted from McHugh et al., 2004.)
SIMPLE RELATIONS
Simple I-YOU:
I have a red brick and you have a green brick.
Which brick do I have? (Red)
Which brick do YOU have? (Green)
I have a green brick and you have a red brick.
Which brick do YOU have? (Red)
Which brick do I have? (Green)
Simple HERE-THERE:
I am sitting here on the blue chair and you are sitting there on the black chair.
Where am I sitting? (Blue)
Where are YOU sitting? (Black)
I am sitting here on the black chair and you are sitting here on the blue chair.
Where are YOU sitting? (Blue)
Where am I sitting? (Black)
Simple NOW-THEN:
Yesterday I was watching television, today I am reading.
What am I doing now? (Reading)
What was I doing then? (Television)
Yesterday I was reading, today I am watching television.
What was I doing then? (Reading)
What am I doing now? (Television)
Yesterday you were reading, today you are watching television.
What are YOU doing now? (Television)
What were YOU doing then? (Reading)
Yesterday you were watching television, today you are reading.
What were YOU doing then? (Television)
What are YOU doing now? (Reading)
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REVERSED RELATIONS
Reversed I-YOU:
I have a red brick and you have a green brick. If I was you and you were me.
Which brick would I have? (Green)
Which brick would YOU have? (Red)
I have a green brick and you have a red brick. If I was you and you were me
Which brick would YOU have? (Green)
Which brick would I have? (Red)
I have a red brick and you have a green brick. If I was you and you were me.
Which brick would YOU have? (Red)
Which brick would I have? (Green)
I have a green brick and you have a red brick. If I was you and you were me
Which brick would I have? (Red)
Which brick would YOU have? (Green)
I am sitting here on the black chair and you are sitting there on the blue chair. If I was
you and you were me.
Where would YOU be sitting? (Black)
Where would I be sitting? (Blue)
I am sitting here on the black chair and you are sitting there on the blue chair. If I was
you and you were me.
Where would I be sitting? (Blue)
Where would YOU be sitting? (Black)
I am sitting here on the blue chair and you are sitting there on the black chair. If I was
you and you were me.
Where would I be sitting? (Black)
Where would YOU be sitting? (Blue)
I am sitting here on the blue chair and you are sitting there on the black chair. If I was
you and you were me.
Where would YOU be sitting? (Blue)
Where would I be sitting? (Black)
Reversed HERE-THERE:
I am sitting here on the blue chair and you are sitting there on the black chair. If here was
there and there was here.
Where would YOU be sitting? (Blue)
Where would I be sitting? (Black)
I am sitting here on the black chair and you are sitting there on the blue chair. If here was
there and there was here.
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Where would I be sitting? (Blue)
Where would YOU be sitting? (Black)
I am sitting here on the blue chair and you are sitting there on the black chair. If here was
there and there was here.
Where would I be sitting? (Black)
Where would YOU be sitting? (Blue)

I am sitting here on the black chair and you are sitting there on the blue chair. If here was
there and there was her.
Where would YOU be sitting? (Black)
Where would I be sitting? (Blue)
Yesterday I was sitting there on the blue chair, today I am sitting here on the black chair.
If here was there and there was here.
Where would I be sitting now? (Blue)
Where was I sitting then? (Black)
Yesterday I was sitting there on the black chair, today I am sitting here on the blue chair.
If here was there and there was here.
Where was I sitting then? (Blue)
Where would I be sitting now? (Black)
Yesterday I was sitting there on the blue chair, today I am sitting here on the black chair.
If here was there and there was here.
Where was I sitting then? (Black)
Where would I be sitting now? (Blue)
Yesterday I was sitting there on the black chair, today I am sitting here on the blue chair.
If here was there and there was here.
Where would I be sitting now? (Black)
Where was I sitting then? (Blue)
Yesterday you were sitting there on the blue chair, today you are sitting here on the black
chair. If here was there and there was here.
Where would you be sitting now? (Blue)
Where were you sitting then? (Black)
Yesterday you were sitting there on the blue chair, today you are sitting here on the black
chair. If here was there and there was here.
Where were you sitting then? (Black)
Where would you be sitting now? (Blue)
Yesterday you were sitting there on the black chair, today you are sitting here on the blue
chair. If here was there and there was here.
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Where would you be sitting now? (Black)
Where were you sitting hen? (Blue)
Yesterday you were sitting here on the black chair, today you are sitting there on the blue
chair. If here was there and there was here.
Where were you sitting then? (Blue)
Where would you be sitting now? (Black)
Reversed NOW-THEN:
Yesterday I was watching television, today I am reading. If now was then and then was
now.
What was I doing then? (Reading)
What would I be doing now? (Television)
Yesterday I was reading, today I am watching television. If now was then and then was
now.
What would I be doing now? (Reading)
What was I doing then? (Television)
Yesterday I was watching television, today I am reading. If now was then and then was
now.
What was I doing now? (Television)
What would I be doing then? (Reading)
Yesterday I was reading, today I am watching television. If now was then and then was
now.
What was I doing then? (Television)
What would I be doing now? (Reading)
Yesterday you were watching television, today you are reading. If now was then and then
was now.
What were you doing then? (Reading)
What would you be doing now? (Television)
Yesterday you were reading, today you are watching television. If now was then and then
was now.
What were you doing then? (Television)
What would you be doing now? (Reading)
Yesterday you were watching television, today you are reading. If now was then and then
was now.
What would you be doing now? (Television)
What were you doing then? (Reading)
Yesterday you were reading, today you are watching television. If now was then and then
was now.
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What would you be doing now? (Reading)
What were you doing then? (Television)
Yesterday I was sitting there on the blue chair, today I am sitting here on the black chair.
If now was then and then was now.
Where would I be sitting now? (Blue)
Where was I sitting then? (Black)
Yesterday I was sitting there on the blue chair, today I am sitting here on the black chair.
If now was then and then was now.
Where was I sitting then? (Black)
Where would I be sitting now? (Blue)
Yesterday I was sitting there on the black chair, today I am sitting here on the blue chair.
If now was then and then was now.
Where would I be sitting now? (Black)
Where was I sitting then? (Blue)
Yesterday I was sitting there on the black chair, today I am sitting here on the blue chair.
If now was then and then was now.
Where was I sitting then? (Blue)
Where would I be sitting now? (Black)
Yesterday you were sitting there on the blue chair, today you are sitting here on the black
chair. If now was then and then was now.
Where were you sitting then? (Black)
Where would you be sitting now? (Blue)
Yesterday you were sitting there on the blue chair, today you are sitting here on the black
chair. If now was then and then was now.
Where would you be sitting now? (Blue)
Where were you sitting then? (Black)
Yesterday you were sitting there on the black chair, today you are sitting here on the blue
chair. If now was then and then was now.
Where were you sitting then? (Blue)
Where would you be sitting now? (Black)
Yesterday you were sitting there on the black chair, today you are sitting here on the blue
chair. If now was then and then was now.
Where would you be sitting now? (Black)
Where were you sitting then? (Blue)
DOUBLE REVERSED RELATIONS
I-YOU/HERE-THERE:
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I am sitting here on the blue chair and you are sitting there on the black chair. If I was
you and you were me and If here was there and there was here.
Where would I be sitting? (Blue)
Where would YOU be sitting? (Black)
I am sitting here on the black chair and you are sitting there on the blue chair. If I was
you and you were me and If here was there and there was here.
Where would I be sitting? (Black)
Where would YOU be sitting? (Blue)
I am sitting here on the blue chair and you are sitting there on the black chair. If I was
you and you were me and If here was there and there was here.
Where YOU be sitting? (Black)
Where would I be sitting? (Blue)
I am sitting here on the black chair and you are sitting there on the blue chair. If I was
you and you were me and If here was there and there was here.
Where would YOU be sitting? (Blue)
Where would I be sitting? (Black)

HERE-THERE/NOW-THEN:
Yesterday I was sitting there on the blue chair, today I am sitting here on the black chair.
If here was there and there was here and If now was then and then was now.
Where would I be sitting then? (Blue)
Where would I be sitting now? (Black)
Yesterday I was sitting there on the blue chair, today I am sitting here on the black chair.
If here was there and there was here and If now was then and then was now.
Where would I be sitting now? (Black)
Where would I be sitting then? (Blue)
Yesterday I was sitting there on the black chair, today I am sitting here on the blue chair.
If here was there and there was here and If now was then and then was now.
Where would I be sitting then? (Black)
Where would I be sitting now? (Blue)
Yesterday I was sitting there on the black chair, today I am sitting here on the blue chair.
If here was there and there was here and If now was then and then was now.
Where would I be sitting now? (Blue)
Where would I be sitting then? (Black)
Yesterday you were sitting there on the blue chair, today you are sitting here on the black
chair. If here was there and there was here and If now was then and then was now.
Where would you be sitting then? (Blue)
Where would you be sitting now? (Black)
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Yesterday you were sitting there on the blue chair, today you are sitting here on the black
chair. If here was there and there was here and If now was then and then was now.
Where would you be sitting now? (Black)
Where would you be sitting then? (Blue)
Yesterday you were sitting there on the black chair, today you are sitting here on the blue
chair. If here was there and there was here and If now was then and then was now.
Where would you be sitting then? (Black)
Where would you be sitting now? (Blue)
Yesterday you were sitting there on the black chair, today you are sitting here on the blue
chair. If here was there and there was here and If now was then and then was now.
Where would you be sitting now? (Blue)
Where would you be sitting then? (Black)
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Appendix II-Revised Social Anhedonia Scale
Please answer each item true or false. Please do not skip any items. It is important that
you answer every item, even if you are not quite certain which the best answer is. Some
items may sound like others, but all of them are slightly different. Answer each item
individually, and don't worry about how you answered a somewhat similar previous item.
Write down either:

True

OR

False

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.

Having close friends is not as important as many people say.
I attach very little importance to having close friends.
I prefer watching television to going out with other people.
A car ride is much more enjoyable if someone is with me.
I like to make long distance phone calls to friends and relatives.
Playing with children is a real chore.
I have always enjoyed looking at photographs of friends.
Although there are things that I enjoy doing by myself, I usually seem to have
more fun when I do things with other people.
9. I sometimes become deeply attached to people I spend a lot of time with.
10. People sometimes think that I am shy when I really just want to be left alone.
11. When things are going really good for my close friends, it makes me feel good
too.
12. When someone close to me is depressed, it brings me down also.
13. My emotional responses seem very different from those of other people.
14. When I am alone, I often resent people telephoning me or knocking on my door.
15. Just being with friends can make me feel really good.
16. When things are bothering me, I like to talk to other people about it.
17. I prefer hobbies and leisure activities that do not involve other people.
18. It's fun to sing with other people.
19. Knowing that I have friends who care about me gives me a sense of security.
20. When I move to a new city, I feel a strong need to make new friends.
21. People are usually better off if they stay aloof from emotional involvements with
most others.
22. Although I know I should have affection for certain people, I don't really feel it.
23. People often expect me to spend more time talking with them than I would like.
24. I feel pleased and gratified as I learn more and more about the emotional life of
my friends.
25. When others try to tell me about their problems and hang-ups, I usually listen
with interest and attention.
26. I never had really close friends in high school.
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27. I am usually content to just sit alone, thinking and daydreaming.
28. I'm much too independent to really get involved with other people.
29. There are few things more tiring than to have a long, personal discussion with
someone.
30. It made me sad to see all my high school friends go their separate ways when high
school was over.
31. I have often found it hard to resist talking to a good friend, even when I have
other things to do.
32. Making new friends isn't worth the energy it takes.
33. There are things that are more important to me than privacy.
34. People who try to get to know me better usually give up after awhile.
35. I could be happy living all alone in a cabin in the woods or mountains.
36. If given the choice, I would much rather be with others than be alone.
37. I find that people too often assume that their daily activities and opinions will be
interesting to me.
38. I don't really feel very close to my friends.
39. My relationships with other people never get very intense.
40. In many ways, I prefer the company of pets to the company of people.
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Appendix III-Deceptive Container Task
The following statements are to be read to participants from cards. The participant is then
asked if they think the entire statement is true or false. There are 24 true belief tasks
(Theory of Mind level 4) and 24 false belief tasks (Theory of Mind level 5) for a total of
48 belief attribution tasks.
True Belief to Self
1. If I put the pencils in the chalk box and you are not here, you would think the
chalk box contains chalk. (True)
2. If I put the pencils in the chalk box and you are here, you would think the chalk
box contains pencils. (True)
3. If I put the chalk in the chalk box and you are not here, you would think the chalk
box contains chalk. (True)
4. If I put the chalk in the chalk box and you are here, you would think the chalk box
contains chalk. (True)
5. If I put the crayons in the cigarettes box and you are not here, you would think the
cigarettes box contains cigarettes. (True)
6. If I put the crayons in the cigarettes box and you are here, you would think the
cigarettes box contains crayons. (True)
7. If I put the cigarettes in the cigarettes box and you are not here, you would think
the cigarettes box contains cigarettes. (True)
8. If I put the cigarettes in the cigarettes box and you are here, you would think the
cigarettes box contains cigarettes. (True)
9. If I put the cigarettes in the crayons box and you are not here, you would think the
crayons box contains crayons. (True)
10. If I put the cigarettes in the crayons box and you are here, you would think the
crayons box contains cigarettes. (True)
11. If I put the crayons in the crayons box and you are not here, you would think the
crayons box contains crayons. (True)
12. If I put the crayons in the crayons box and you are here, you would think the
crayons box contains crayons. (True)
True Belief to Another
1. If you put the pencils in the chalk box and I am not here, I would think the chalk
box contains chalk. (True)
2. If you put the pencils in the chalk box and I am here, I would think the chalk box
contains pencils. (True)
3. If you put the chalk in the chalk box and I am not here, I would think the chalk
box contains chalk. (True)
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4. If you put the chalk in the chalk box and I am here, I would think the chalk box
contains chalk. (True)
5. If you put the crayons in the cigarettes box and I am not here, I would think the
cigarettes box contains cigarettes. (True)
6. If you put the crayons in the cigarettes box and I am here, I would think the
cigarettes box contains crayons. (True)
7. If you put the cigarettes in the cigarettes box and I am not here, I would think the
cigarettes box contains cigarettes. (True)
8. If you put the cigarettes in the cigarettes box and I am here, I would think the
cigarettes box contains cigarettes. (True)
9. If you put the cigarettes in the crayons box and I am not here, I would think the
crayons box contains crayons. (True)
10. If you put the cigarettes in the crayons box and I am here, I would think the
crayons box contains cigarettes. (True)
11. If you put the crayons in the crayons box and I am not here, I would think the
crayons box contains crayons. (True)
12. If you put the crayons in the crayons box and I am here, I would think the crayons
box contains crayons. (True)
False Belief to Self
1. If I put the pencils in the chalk box and you are here, you would think the chalk
box contains chalk. (False)
2. If I put the pencils in the chalk box and you are not here, you would think the
chalk box contains pencils. (False)
3. If I put the chalk in the chalk box and you are not here, you would think the chalk
box contains pencils. (False)
4. If I put the chalk in the chalk box and you are here, you would think the chalk box
contains pencils. (False)
5. If I put the crayons in the cigarettes box and you are here, you would think the
cigarettes box contains cigarettes. (False)
6. If I put the crayons in the cigarettes box and you are not here, you would think the
cigarettes box contains crayons. (False)
7. If I put the cigarettes in the cigarettes box and you are not here, you would think
the cigarettes box contains crayons. (False)
8. If I put the cigarettes in the cigarettes box and you are here, you would think the
cigarettes box contains crayons. (False)
9. If I put the cigarettes in the crayons box and you are here, you would think the
crayons box contains crayons. (False)
10. If I put the cigarettes in the crayons box and you are not here, you would think the
crayons box contains cigarettes. (False)
11. If I put the crayons in the crayons box and you are not here, you would think the
crayons box contains cigarettes. (False)
12. If I put the crayons in the crayons box and you are here, you would think the
crayons box contains cigarettes. (False)
False Belief to Another
1. If you put the pencils in the chalk box and I am here, I would think the chalk box
contains chalk. (False)
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2. If you put the pencils in the chalk box and I am not here, I would think the chalk
box contains pencils. (False)
3. If you put the chalk in the chalk box and I am not here, I would think the chalk
box contains pencils. (False)
4. If you put the chalk in the chalk box and I am here, I would think the chalk box
contains pencils. (False)
5. If you put the crayons in the cigarettes box and I am here, I would think the
cigarettes box contains cigarettes. (False)
6. If you put the crayons in the cigarettes box and I am not here, I would think the
cigarettes box contains crayons. (False)
7. If you put the cigarettes in the cigarettes box and I am not here, I would think the
cigarettes box contains crayons. (False)
8. If you put the cigarettes in the cigarettes box and I am here, I would think the
cigarettes box contains crayons. (False)
9. If you put the cigarettes in the crayons box and I am here, I would think the
crayons box contains crayons. (False)
10. If you put the cigarettes in the crayons box and I am not here, I would think the
crayons box contains cigarettes. (False)
11. If you put the crayons in the crayons box and I am not here, I would think the
crayons box contains cigarettes. (False)
12. If you put the crayons in the crayons box and I am here, I would think the crayons
box contains cigarettes. (False)

59

Appendix IV-Hinting Task
The following 10 hinting tasks have been developed for participants based on relevant
scenarios in the participant’s environment in order to ensure that the task is applicable to
daily living. Participants will be able to score a maximum of 3 points per scenario (2
points for a correct first answer, 1 point for a correct second answer, and 0 points for an
incorrect answer).
1. “Paul says to his friend George: ‘I can’t afford groceries. Could you lend me
some money? George answers: I have to buy groceries too.”
Question 1: “What does Paul really mean when he says this?”
“George then says: The groceries I want are going to be very expensive.”
Question 2: “What does George want to say to Paul?”
Correct response: No, I cannot lend you any money.
2. “Paul has to go to a job interview and he’s running late. While he is cleaning his
shoes, he says to his wife, Jane: “I want to wear my blue shirt but it’s very
creased.”
Question 1: “What does Paul really mean when he says this?”
“Paul then says: It’s in the ironing basket.”
Question 2: “What does Paul want Jane to do?”
Correct response: Paul wants Jane to iron his blue shirt.
3. "George has been on the phone with his friend for over an hour. George says: My
mother ought to call me in few minutes”
Question 1: “What does George really mean when he says this?”
“George then says: I could call you back tomorrow.”
Question 2: “What does George want to do?”
Correct response: George wants to hang up the phone.
4. “Paul is watching his favorite tv show with George. George says: The big game is
about to start on channel 13.”
Question 1: “What does George really mean when he says this?”
“George then says: I’d really like to see the game.”
Question 2: “What does George want Paul to do?”
Correct response: George wants Paul to change the channel.
5. “Paul is going to the casino tonight and asks George if he would like to go too.
George says: I went to the casino last week.”
Question 1: “What does George really mean when he says this?”
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“George then says: My paycheck doesn’t come in until tomorrow.”
Question 2: “What does George want to say to Paul?”
Correct response: George wants to say that he doesn’t want to go to the casino.
6. “Paul is listening to music on the van’s radio. George says: I have a headache.”
Question 1: “What does George really mean when he says this?”
“George then says: The music is very loud”
Question 2: “What does George want Paul to do?”
Correct response: George wants Paul to turn the radio down/off.
7. “Paul is smoking on the porch. George says to Paul: I ran out of cigarettes.”
Question 1: “What does George really mean when he says this?”
“George then says: I could really go for a smoke right now”
Question 2: “What does George want Paul to do?”
Correct response: George wants Paul to give him a cigarette.
8. “Paul is walking around the yard in the sun. George says to Paul: You’ve been
out there for an hour.”
Question 1: “What does George really mean when he says this?”
“George then says: The sun is going to burn you’re skin”
Question 2: “What does George want Paul to do?”
Correct response: George wants Paul to go inside.
9. “Paul is talking to George about personal things in a restaurant. George says to
Paul: I think we’re bothering people.”
Question 1: “What does George really mean when he says this?”
“George then says: This is making me uncomfortable”
Question 2: “What does George want Paul to do?”
Correct response: George wants Paul to stop talking to himself.
10. “Paul and George are arguing about who is better, the Red Sox or the Rays.
George says to Paul: the Red Sox beat the Yankees and the Yankees beat the
Rays.
Question 1: “What does George really mean when he says this?”
“George then says: The Yankees weren’t even at their best when they beat the
Rays”
Question 2: “What does George want to say to Paul?”
Correct response: George wants to tell Paul that the Red Sox will beat the Rays.
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